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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Athletic Performance Institute, L.L.C. ("API"), Utah Baseball Academy, Inc. ("the
Academy"), Robert Keyes together known as "API," through their undersigned counsel,
respectfully submit this brief in the appeal before this Court.
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute.'' 1 Utah Code §
78A-4-103(2)O), provides "[t]he Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction ... , over orders,
judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction[.]" 2 This is an appeal from a summary judgment, the final
judgment of the Third District Court in a civil matter, and although it has original appellate
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant
to Utah Code§ 78A-3-102(4).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE I:

Whether the Trial Court erred finding Key Bank was under no obligation

to make interest payments?

Standard of Review: "A contract's interpretation may be either a question of law,
determined by the words of the agreement, or a question of fact, determined by extrinsic
evidence of intent. If a trial court interprets a contract as a matter of law, we accord its
construction no particular weight, reviewing its action under a correctness standard.
However, if the contract is not an integration or is ambiguous and the trial court proceeds to
find facts respecting the intentions of the parties based on extrinsic evidence, then our review
.

.

is strictly limited." Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985); see also 50 W

1

Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5.

2

Utah Code § 78A-3-102(3)O) (2009, as amended).
1

la)
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Broadway Assocs. v. Redevelopment Agency ofSalt Lake City, 784 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah
1989).
Preservation of the Issue: Findings of Fact and Legal Analysis, Rec. 20520-20577
(hereinafter "FOF"), 11 54-68, I 62-168.
Determinative Law: The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in
most contractual relationships and requires a party in a contract to perform "consistent with
the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party." Oakwood Viii.

LLCv. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101,143,104 P.3d 1226 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). This is recognized "where it is clear from the parties' 'course of dealings' or
a settled custom or usage of trade that the parties undoubtedly would have agreed to the
covenant if they had considered and addressed it." Young Living Essential Oils, LCv. Marin,

~

2011 UT 64,, 10,266 P.3d 814 (quoting Oakwood Viii., 2004 UT 101,, 43, 104 P.3d 1226).
One such duty is an "implied duty that contracting parties 'refrain from actions that will

~

intentionally destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract."' Id.

ISSUE II: Whether the Trial Court erred in finding that KeyBank did not commit
bad faith, breach its fiduciary duty, or breach the loan documents when it failed to provide
API with long term loan financing and to cooperate with API's application for replacement
financing?

2
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¼:.I

Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the trial court's application of an
objective legal standard for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's conclusions
oflaw. Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379,112, 173 P.3d 865.
vJ

Preservation of the Issue:

FOF, 11169-207.

Determinative Law: See Issue I, above.
ISSUE III:

Whether the Trial Court improperly found that KeyBank's failure to

.$)

timely pay Draw Request No. 6 caused API no damage?
Standard of Review: The question of whether a duty exists is a question of law.

Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc, 2009 UT 44, 118, 215 P.3d 152. The appellate court
reviews the trial court's application of an objective legal standard for correctness, granting
no deference to the trial court's conclusions oflaw. Markham, 2007 UT App 379, ~12.
Preservation of the Issue: FOF, 11 36-42, 101-161, 209(1, III).
Determinative Law: "[T]o determine whether a fiduciary duty should be implied in
law due to the factual situations surrounding the transaction and the relationship of the
parties, we consider the following principles: A fiduciary relationship imparts a position of
peculiar confidence placed by one individual in another. A fiduciary is a person with a duty
to act primarily for the benefit of another. A fiduciary is in a positio~ to have and exercise
IJ

and does have and exercise influence over another. A fiduciary relationship implies a
condition of superiority of one of the parties over the other. Generally, in a fiduciary
relationship, the property, interest or authority of the other is placed in the charge of

3
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fiduciary." First Sec. Bank NA. v. Banberry Dev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1333 (Utah 1990).
See Issue I, above, for the standard for the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
ISSUE IV:

Whether the Trial Court erred in denying API's right to a jury trial?

Standard of Review: Whether there is a right to a jury trial is a question oflaw that

is reviewed for correctness. Failure v. MegaDyne Med. Prods., 2009 UT App 179, 19, 213
P .3d 899. A trial court's finding that a party waived its right _to a jury trial is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Aspenwood v. C.A. T., 2003 UT App 28, 133, 73 P.3d 94 7.
Preservation of the Issue: Motion to Strike Jury Demand (Rec. 2222-2360) and

associated memoranda (Rec. 2384-2397, 2537-2544); Order Regarding December 6, 2007
Motions Hearing (Rec. 4192-4195); Motion to Reinstate Jury (Rec. 12609-12652) and
associated memoranda (Rec. 13035-13213, 13273-13298); Order Denying Motion to
Reinstate Jury and Granting Motion to Bifurcate Third-Party Claims Against Sporturf, Inc.
(Rec. 16244-16246). Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, filed April 4, 2011 (Rec. 16258);
Order Denying Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order (Rec. 16288-16270).
Determinative Law: Article I, Section 10, of the Utah Constitution guarantees the

right to a jury trial in civil cases. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor
& Implement, 626 P .2d 418, 420 (Utah 1981 ). It is axiomatic that for there to be a waiver

there must be an existing legal right which may be waived. American Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v.
Blomquist, 445 P .2d 1 (1968).

ISSUE V:

Whether the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment on API's

claims for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, lost profits, and fraud?
4
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Standard of Review: "A challenge to a summary judgment presents solely a question
of law that we review for correctness." V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 942 P.2d
906, 9 IO (Utah I 996). "We assess only 'whether the trial court erred in applying the
governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that there was no disputed issues of
material fact." Ferry v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). "We review all relevant facts,
including all inference arising from those facts, in a light most favorable to the losing party.
If, after a review of the record, it appears that there is a material factual issue, we are
compelled to reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment." Amina Mut. Jns. Co. v.

Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah App. 1989).
Preservation of the Issue: Order Regarding Summary Judgment Motions Heard
September 26, 2008 (Rec. I 0529-10535); Motions for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(6)(Rec. I0537A-l 1015) and associatedmemoranda(Rec.11044-11264; 1129211306, 11314-11360, 11421-11574 ); Order Granting Counterclaim Plaintiffs' Motion for
Relief from Judgment (Rec.12668-12672); Orders Denying Motion for Relief from Judgment
Pursuant to Rule 60(b)( 6) (Rec. 12678- 12719); Motion for Relief From Judgment Under
Rules 60(b)(l) and 60(b)3) (Rec. 16271-16383) and associated memoranda (Rec. 1638416538). Order (Rec. 16544-16546); KeyBank's Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Second Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress (Rec. 16957-16967)
and associated memoranda (Rec. 18424-18464); Order Granting Motion for Summary
Judgment (Rec. 18551-185 53 ). Motion for Relief from Judgment under URCP 60 (Rec.

5
~
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18393-18423) and associated memoranda (Rec. 18469-184 77, 18485-18542); Order (Rec.
18560-18563).
Determinative Law: "A district court should exercise care in granting summary

judgment on fact-dependent questions." IHV Health Servs. v. D&K Mgmt., 2008 UT 73,118,

~

196 P.3d 588.
ISSUE VI:

Whether the Trial Court erred in denying API's motion for a retrial?

Standard of Review: In deciding whether to grant a new trial, a trial court has some

discretion, and we reverse only for abuse of that discretion. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817
P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). "[W]e review the trial court's findings of fact for clear error."
Nexmed, Inc. v. Mann, 2005 UT App 431,110, 24 P.3d 252.
Preservation of the Issue: API Parties' Motion for Mistrial (Rec. 20754-20822) and

associated memoranda (Rec. 20842-21294, 21303-21336); Ruling and Order (Rec. 2134321345).
Determinative Law: Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides grounds

for a new trial as follows: "(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial
may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes ... ( 1) Irregularity in the proceeds of the court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having
a fair trial." See Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm 'n, 945 P.2d 125, 135 (Utah App. 1997).
RULES AND REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO APPEAL

See Appendix, tab 53.
6
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:

Robert Keyes, Athletic Performance Institute and the Utah Baseball Academy
(collectively "AP]") cosigned for a 12 month construction and 20 year long-term loan with
KeyBank to build an athletic training facility, because of funding failures it ended up suitable
only for indoor baseball. The loan included funds for interest on the construction loan, and
the course-of-dealing was for KeyBank to pay interest. KeyBank defaulted in payment and
assessed penalties against AP] for KeyBank's failure.
vJ

Key Bank's Vice-President took part of the loan proceeds to pay his personal bills.
This breached the loan agreement, SBA regulations, banking regulations, and violated
KeyBank ethics. Later the same Vice-President became the third loan administrator, and
under his supervision KeyBank defaulted in paying Draw 6. That default caused this and
related lawsuits. The unpaid construction contractor stopped work, filed a lien, and sued AP]
and KeyBank. The Trial Court bifurcated the case sending the contractor's claims to
arbitration. Later the remaining claims were again bifurcated to avoid a jury trial.
The arbitration awarded $1 million in damages against API because the failure to pay
Draw 6 by KeyBank breached the construction contract. This breach relieved the contractor
from the duty to correct defects or complete work. KeyBank was not a party in arbitration.
The Trial Court caused inconsistent outcomes by allowing API to be blamed for not paying
in the arbitration, but deciding that did not damage APL

vi
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The Trial Court found Key Bank's Vice-President removed loan proceeds from the API
loan, but disallowed any recovery for that breach. The Trial Court denied API's right to a
jury trial, but found as an undisputed fact Robert Keyes never read the loan documents to
"knowingly and intentionally waive" the right to a jury. The Trial Court certified the jury

~

question for an interlocutory appeal, but the Appeals Court refused to decide the question.
Through multiple summary judgments the Trial Court denied API any hearing on the
merits for claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, consequential damages, bad
faith and fraud.
The trial judge was killed while bicycling. At his funeral API discovered he was an
avid member of a bicycle club funded by KeyBank's law firm. The trial judge competed as
a teammate of KeyBank's lawyers and his jersey advertised KeyBank's law firm. This

~-

relationship was not disclosed by the judge, despite a request for him to recuse himself on
other grounds. A motion for a new trial because of his failure to disclose the conflict was
denied. F ol1owing trial, two conflicting orders were signed less than a minute apart.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW:
I.

10/24/2005, Cameo Construction, Inc. ("Cameo") filed a complaint to foreclose

on its mechanic's lien, naming both API and KeyBank as defendants. (Rec. 1-12.)
2.

03/01/2006, the Trial Court dismissed Robert Keyes from the action, finding

he was not a party to Cameo's claims. (Rec. 552-554.)

8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Cw

3.

06/02/2006, the matter was bifurcated and Cameo proceeded with its claims

against API in arbitration 3 • (Rec. 1022-1025.)
4.

05/16/2007, API filed their Second Amended Counterclaim against Key Bank.

(Rec. 1815-1891.)
5.

In 07 /2007 and 03/2008, hearings were held in the arbitration. The Arbitrator's

Final Decision and Award was made on 04/23/2008. (API Trial Exhibit ("API.Ex.") 702.)
6.

08/27/2007, KeyBank filed its Motion to Strike Jury Demand. (Rec. 2222-

7.

01/07/2008, the Trial Court Granted Key Bank's Motion to Strike Jury Demand.

2224.)

(Rec. 4192-4195.)

8.

04/30/2008, KeyBank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Rec. 5873-

9.

11/21/2008, the Trial Court entered its Order Regarding Summary Judgment

5875.)

Motions Heard September 26, 2008, limiting portions of APl's Breach of Contract,
Conversion, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and Constructive Fraud claims, and dismissing their
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Estoppel, Negligence, and Fraud claims. (Rec.
10529-10535.)
I 0.

04/21/2009, API filed their Motion for Protective Order and Motion in Limine

to Exclude Arbitration Proceedings, Depositions, and Award. (Rec. 12445-12447.)

3

The Academy was dismissed from arbitration because they were not a party to the
agreement authorizing arbitration.
9
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11.

04/29/2009) the Trial Court granted APl's Motion for Relief from Judgment

Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress), reinstating this
claim. (Rec. 12668-12672.)
12.

05/28/2009, KeyBank filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of

Claims Based on Unpaid Draw Requests (Rec. 14207-14210), Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Claims for Lost Profits (Rec. 14253-14255), and Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Claims for Final 5% Contractual Late Charge (Rec. 14327-1433 l ).
13.

06/22/2009, API filed their Motion to Recuse the Honorable Anthony B.

Quinn. (Rec. 15241-15244.)
14.

06/22/2009, API filed their Motion to Seal Portions of the Case File. (Rec.

15270-15272.)
15.

07/02/2009, Trial Court entered a Ruling and Order denying motion to recuse.

(Rec. 15735-15739.)
16.

07 /I 4/2009, API filed their Motion to Recuse the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn

under Reese v. Tingey Construction. (Rec. 15969-15972.)
17.

07/22/2009, Trial Court denied API's Motion to Recuse the Honorable Anthony

B. Quinn under Reese v. Tingey Construction, and certified it for interlocutory appeal. (Rec.
I 6021-16024.)
18.

08/03/2009, API filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal. (Rec. 16070.)

19.

l l /24/20 I 0, the Supreme Court of Utah declined to consider the merits ofAP I's

arguments and affirmed Judge Quinn's decision denying the disqualification motion. (Rec.

IO
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16102a- l 6 l 02) (A corrected opinion was issued by the Supreme Court of Utah on
02/11/2011. (Rec. 16223-16232)).
20.

03/15/201 1, the Trial Court denied APl's Motion to Reinstate Jury and granted

the Motion to Bifurcate Third-Party Claims Against Sporturf, Inc. (Rec. 16244-16246.)
vi

03/15/2011, the Trial Court denied AP I's Motion to Seal Portions of the Case

21.

File. (Rec. 16247-16249.)
22.

The Trial Court certified the question of API's right to a jury for interlocutory

appeal and on 04/04/2011, API filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal to reinstate the jury.
VP

(Rec. 16258.)
23.

06/06/2011, the Utah Court of Appeals denied API's Petition for Interlocutory

Appeal. (Rec. 16268-16270.)
24.

06/01/2012, Key Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Second

Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. (Rec. 16957-16959.)
~

25.

08/13/2012, the Trial Court entered its Order Granting Motion for Summary

Judgment on the Second Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
vJ

(Rec. 18551-18553.)
26.

10/05/2012, KeyBank filed its Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of the

API's D~ages Incurred in Connection with the Arbitration. (Rec. l 8664-18666.)
27.

Between 05/21/2013 and 06/11/2013, the Trial Court conducted an 11 day

bench trial.

11
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28.

06/19/2013, the Trial Court entered its Findings of Fact and Legal Analysis.

(Rec. 20520-20577.)
29.

08/29/2013 at 7: 15:35 AM, the Trial Court entered API's Proposed Order on

Trial. (Rec. 20608-20610.)
30.

08/29/2013 at 7: I 6: 15 AM, the Trial Court entered Judgment of Dismissal.

(Rec. 20611-20613.)
31.

0l/06/2014, API filed a Motion for Mistrial based on the fact Honorable

Anthony B. Quinn had failed to disclose he was a cycling teammate of KeyBank's counsel.
(Rec. 20820-20822.)
32.

03/10/2014, Trial Court deniedAPI'sMotion for Mistrial. (Rec. 21343-21345.)

33.

05/26/2015, a Default Certificate was entered against Sporturf, Inc. (Rec.

~

1

21589-21592.)
34.

10/16/2015 Default Judgment was entered against Sporturf, Inc. (Rec. 21662-

21663.)
35.

11/04/2015, API filed their Notice of Appeal. (Rec. 21668-21670.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
I.

This action was commenced by Cameo against API, and KeyBank. (Rec. 1-

12). Cameo was building for API and had not been paid. Id. KeyBank financed the
construction. (Id.)
2.

API filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Third Party Complaint. (Rec. 138-

320.) The Third Party Complaint added Evergreen Synthetic and Sporturflntemational as
12
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parties claiming they may be responsible for some construction repairs. (Id.)
3.

11/29/2006, KeyBank filed its Answer, Counterclaim, Crossclaim and Third

Party Complaint. (Rec. 1064-1110.) The Third Party Complaint asked to foreclose on API's
building, appoint a receiver, and enforce personal guarantees. (Id.)
4.

API filed a Counterclaim against KeyBank for among other things, breach of

contract, negligence, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. (Rec. 1441-1527;
Amended Counterclaim at Rec. 1528-1616.) KeyBank's failure to fund the construction
beginning with Draw 6 caused all the disputes between all the parties. (Id.) When Cameo
was not paid for completed work they stopped, filed a lien, and commenced litigation. (Id.)
5.

The Arbitrator limited the proceeding to API (individually) and Cameo, finding

the Baseball Academy was not involved. (API .Ex. 702.) The Arbitration Award was entered
04/23/2008 awarding Cameo $680,000 for non-payment by API (the Arbitrator could not
consider KeyBank's failure to pay because they were not before him and KeyBank had no
contract with Cameo). (Rec. 4726-4933.) Cameo filed a copy of the Final Arbitration
Award with the Trial Court to enforce the judgment. (Id.)
6.

When the Award was filed by Cameo, KeyBank began to use testimony and

documents obtained through the ADR proceeding as support for various motions, resulting
in a Motion to Recuse Honorable Anthony B. Quinn, and a subsequent interlocutory appeal.
7.

The arbitration was conducted in two phases ("levels"). (API.Ex. 702, p. 1.)

The first level addressed the nature and scope of the parties' agreement, and API's claims for
consequential damages for late construction against Cameo. (Id.) The second level included
13
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contract damages from Cameo's claims of payment under the contract and API's
counterclaims for damages for incomplete, defective, or deficient work. (Id.)
8.

The arbitrator found "[t]here is no evidence of any contractual relationship

between Utah Baseball Academy and Cameo." (Id., p. 2.) UBA and Keyes were not parties

~

to the arbitration, leaving only Cameo and AP] to arbitrate. (Id.) KeyBank was excluded
from the arbitration. (Id.) The arbitrator noted, "AP] and Key Bank [sic] are pursuing their
respective claims against the other in separate litigation." (Id. at p. 3, fn. 3.) However, the
arbitrator invited Evergreen and Sporturf to participate, but they declined. As a result, the
arbitrator specifically stated "problems in the turf areas of the building ... was a matter
between AP] and its excavation, dirt and turf contractors." (Id. at p. 5.) The arbitration was
solely between Cameo and API and excluded UBA, Robert Keyes, Key Bank, and
Sporturf. The issues were limited and the evidence admitted was curtailed to the limited
issues, claims, and defenses between those two parties. (Id., Emphasis added).

9.

The KeyBank loan contained funds for interest payments on the construction

loan. (APJ.Ex. 18, 67, 204; KeyBank Trial Exhibit ("KB.Ex.") 106, Bates #KB5682,
KB5688; Rec. 21703, p. 12:6-13:10.)
l 0.

The Parties' course of dealing was for KeyBank to make interest payments on

the construction loan as they came due. Jeff Breese managed the loan and KeyBank paid
themselves for construction interest directly. (Rec. 21703, pp. 12:6-13: I 0, 30: 11-14; API.Ex.
204; KB.Ex. 106, Bates #K.82078.)
11.

"A construction equity account is treated under the Loan documents as Loan
14
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proceeds, s:uch that only Key Bank could approve disbursements from the construction equity
account." (FOF, 189.)
12.

KeyBank delayed paying interest because interest calculations should have

been sent to the account manager, Jeff Breese, but were mailed to Mr. Keyes instead, who
was not responsible to pay them under the course-of-dealing between the parties. (Rec.
21703, pp. 27:9-15; KB.Ex. 106, Bates #KB5662, #KB5681.) The Trial Court found: "For
a period of time, KeyBank routinely made the monthly interest payments automatically."
(FOF, ,Il65.)
13.

Loan manager Jeff Breese was informed of the interest due by KeyBank's

system and he, not APl, would pay the interest when due. (Rec. 21703, p. 13:11-25.) It was
KeyBank who was responsible for late payments of interest, and internal KeyBank
correspondence identified the late payment of interest as a KeyBank failure. (Id.; also
KB.Ex. 106, Bates #KB5659.) 14.

Because the interest payments were not made on time, KeyBank assessed

penalties. (FOF, 1167, 190.)
15.

The penalties were included in the loan payoff because KeyBank refused to

release their construction loan lien without those amounts included. (FOF, 1191-194.)
vJ

16.

The Trial Court inconsistently concluded "nowhere in the KeyBank files or

documents related to the Construction Loans" was there any obligation for KeyBank to make
interest payments from the loan itself. (FOF, 156.) But the Trial Court also concluded "the
Construction Loan was large enough to include amounts to pay ongoing interest during the
15
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construction phase." (FOF, ~163.)
17.

The original loan included both the temporary 12 month construction loan and

a 20 year long-term permanent loan. (API.Ex. 59, 61, 64.)
18.

The Pre-Closing Package document prepared by KeyBank and shown to API

XL.

described these loans as" 12 month construction, 20 year permanent mortgage." (API.Ex. 64.)
19.

The internal Key Bank Commitment Letter Request describes the loans as,

"Construction-12 months of interest only. Pennanent-20 year tenn with a 20 Year
Amortization." (API.Ex. 65.)
20.

KeyBank's permanent loan to APl was to be an SBA 504 loan. (API.Ex. 66,

67 at 1,r.B.3.a., C.2.)
21.

KeyBank knew the SBA would require a certification from KeyBank before

~..

the 504 loan closing for "the amount of the interim loan disbursed, that the interim loan has
been disbursed in reasonable compliance with this Authorization[.]" (API.Ex. 67, at ,IB.2.c.)
~

22.

When KeyBank refused to provide the long-term loan they committed to

provide, API had to locate replacement funding. (Rec. 17409, ,237).
23.

When asked for a payoff required to obtain a replacement loan, KeyBank

responded on August 8, 2006 that "$1,789,582.11" was the full payment due. (Re~. 21701
~

atl14:13-17)
24.

12/26/2006 KeyBank increased the payoff and gave two different amounts:

"$1,922,040.55" at 12:50 and then lowered it to "$1,903,869.61" at 4:30 (FOF, 11186-89;
Rec. 21701 at 114:18-23).
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25.
~

As API aggressively pursued refinancing, KeyBank sued. API asked for more

time to answer. (Rec. 1324-1334.)
26.

KeyBank filed a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment on January 19, 2007

seeking foreclosure, judgment for $1,834,211.70, for a receivership to control APl's assets,
attorney fees and additional interest. (Rec. 1341-1367.) The relief sought would have ended
API's business and rendered them unable to pursue any claims against KeyBank. (Rec.
v;

17414, 1258).
Less than a month later on 02/12/2007, KeyBank increased the payoff to

27.
vJ

"$2,029,022.54" complicating APl's refinancing efforts. (Rec. 21703 at 204: 10-25; Rec.
17411, 1246).
28.

03/07/2007, KeyBank quoted the pay-off at "$2,047,577.00" which was paid

by a replacement loan from Mountain American Credit Union ("MACU") through a less
favorable SBA 7a loan. (Rec. 21703 at 204: I 0-25, 205: I.)
~

29.

The loan payoff quotes included repaying a $100,000.00 equity reserve to

KeyBank a second time, and penalties and attorney fees. (Rec. 21703 at 204: I 0-25, 205: I).
v,

30.

The Trial Court identified the key issue to be whether any mishandling ofDraw

6 by KeyBank caused damage to APL (FOF, 1138.)
31.

The Trial Court found KeyBank mishandled Draw Request 6. (Rec. 20576).

32.

The Trial Court found on April 29, 2005, Mr. Preston ofKeyBank misinformed

Mr. Smith of Cameo that Mr. Keyes had not approved of the Draw 6. On the contrary, Mr.
l:J)

Keyes had repeatedly approved payment of Draw 6. (FOF, ,r,r 40, Rec. 20578).
17
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33.

May 4, 2005, Cameo filed a lien for $308,000 on the API building. (FOF, ~40.)

34.

The Trial Court found Camco"would have filled the lien in light ofthe ongoing

disputes between the parties, regardless of the actions of Mr. Preston or KeyBank." (FOF,
~

,148.)
35.

On June 15, 2005, Cameo wrote API and stated, "although Cameo has no legal

responsibility to tear out the concrete floor and repour the vapor barrier, we are willing to do
so, at considerable expense, if a reasonable contract settlement can be reached in the next few
days." (API.Ex. 372.)
36.

When asked about this letter at trial, Clark Smith of Cameo stated that a

reasonable contract settlement included payment of Cameo's lien. (Rec. 21704, pp. 161: 1325, 162:1-163:2.)
37.

By this time KeyBank refused to authorize disbursement of any draw requests

because ofa subcontractor's lien for retention (5%) and the Cameo lien. These were filed in
March, and May 2005, months after Draw 6 should have been paid by KeyBank. (FOF, ,3842.)
~

38.

The Trial Court found that on August 25, 2005, Mr. Naylor (API's architect),

wrote Cameo and stated he was not authorizing payment of Draw Request No. 8. (FOF,
,153.)

1w

39.

The Trial Court found that "[b]ecause of Mr. Naylor's failure to approve of

Draw Request No. 8, Cameo terminated all work on the project and demanded full payment."
The Trial Court concluded that "[i]t was the failure to certify Draw Request No. 8, and not
18
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the failure to certify Draw Request No. 6, that prompted this action." (FOF, ,154.) This
finding is speculation that is contrary to the mechanic's lien filed after Draw 6 was not paid.
40.

Draw Request No. 8 is distinguishable from any of the earlier draw requests.

It was only "retention "-a type of security in construction. Generally, when a project is
finished, the owner does a final inspection to create a punch list and normally withholds
amounts the owner feels are appropriate to complete the punch list. Once the punch list is
satisfactorily completed, the owner certifies the retention draw for payment. (Rec. 21700,

p. 49:17-25, 50:1-7.)
41.

In March of 2005, Mr. Naylor (API's architect) wrote Cameo and identified

punch list items. (KB.Ex. 39.)
42.

Cameo's Draw Request No. 8 included all of Cameo's retention. This request

was routed to Mr. Naylor, who then visited the site to inspect whether the March 2005 punch
list items had been corrected. (Rec. 21700, p. 49:17-25, 50:1-7.)
~

43.

Mr. Naylor conducted a site inspection and concluded that no work had been

accomplished since 03/14/2005. As a result, Mr. Naylor informed Cameo in a letter dated
08/25/ 2005, he would not approve paying retention. Mr. Naylor, however, did not state
Cameo would not receive any payments; his failure to certify was limited solely to the
~

retention draw. (KB.Ex. 56; Rec. 21700, p. 49: 15-50:8.)
44.

This was the first time Cameo asked Mr. Naylor to certify a draw request. The

course of dealing did not require his certification, although this was contrary to the Draw
Process Overview. (FOF 106; Rec. 21700, p. 50:18-51:4; API.Ex. 63.)
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45.

In· response, Cameo informed API on 09/15/2005, that.API was obligated to

pay for construction pending final resolution of the claim and acknowledged API had
approved draws 2, 6, and 7. (FOF, 1154.)
46.

KeyBank refused all further payments because of the $1,000 Midwest lien

~

recorded months after KeyBank failed to pay Draw 6. (FOF, 142.)
4 7.

At arbitration, API was ordered to pay Cameo damages and attorney's fees

when the arbitrator found API's failure to pay Cameo relieved any obligation to perform
under the construction contract. (API.Ex.702.)
48.

02/16/2007, API filed its counterclaim against KeyBank and demanded a jury

trial. (Rec. 1441.)
49.

KeyBank did not challenge the right to a jury in its answer. (Rec. 2389.)

50.

08/27/2007, Key Bank moved to strike API's jury demand. It based its motion

on the loan documents: "Lender and Borrower hereby waive the right to any jury trial in any
action, proceeding, or counterclaim brought by either Lender or Borrower against the other."
(Rec. 2223-25.)
51.

API opposed the motion to strike. API argued KeyBank waived its right to

assert the jury waiver when it failed to raise it in its answer to API's counterclaim and waited
nearly seven months (Rec. 2388-91); that the waiver was unenforceable because (I) it was
inconspicuously located in fine print on boiler plate bank forms, (2) the disparity of
bargaining power between Robert Keyes and KeyBank left Keyes with no ability to make any
changes to loan documents, and (3) on its face, the waiver language was overbroad and
20
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without limiting language, contemplating jury waiver in any daim at any time between the
parties. (Rec. 2391-94.)
52.

API also argued KeyBank could not enforce a jury waiver that derives from a

contract Key Bank breached because a party cannot both breach their contract and then claim
the benefits arising under the contract. (Rec. 2393-2396.)
53.

The Trial Court granted KeyBank's Motion to Strike Jury Demand, but held

that it would revisit this issue if it were determined KeyBank had breached its loan
documents as a matter of law. (Rec. 4193.)
54.

04/21/2009, API argued in its first Motion to Reinstate the Jury that a jury for

the entire proceeding was proper because API had not waived its right to a jury for its claims
asserted against Sporturf. (Rec. 12613.)
55.

API argued: (1) Keyes could not have knowingly and intelligently waived his

rights to a jury by signing documents he did not read, (2) a contractual waiver is
~

unenforceable because it was buried in fine print on boilerplate forms, (3) the waiver is
unenforceable because of the disparate bargaining power between the parties (4) KeyBank
did not rely upon jury waiver during the contract performance period when it filed its
foreclosure action, or when they answered the Counterclaim. (Rec. 12616, 12619.)
56.

Though acknowledging Keyes did not read the loan documents, the Trial Court

declined to consider Keyes' failure to read as a knowingly and inte1ligent waiver of a jury
trial because "somebody who doesn't read their loan documents cannot possibly be in a better
position than someone who does under the law." (Rec. 21695, p. 49:15-50:6.)
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57.

The Trial Court's refusal to reinstate a jury was tied to its decision to bifurcate

Sporturf. The Trial Court initially denied bifurcation because "the issue of Jost profits was

~

an issue that was common to both KeyBank and Sport Turf [sic] and, in fact, KeyBank had
made a request to allocate fault with respect to that issue, and so that needed to be decided
in one case, which would affect, obviously, that there's going to have to be a jury respect to
that issue." (Rec. 21695, pp. 50:7-21.)
58.

API's right to a jury for claims involving Sporturf caused the Trial Court to re-

think whether there should be a jury for all issues. (Id.)
59.

The Trial Court also noted it granted partial summary judgment disposing of

lost profits. In so doing, the Trial Court believed there were no common issues remaining
between KeyBank and Sporturf. (Id. at 50:22-25, 51: 1-8.)
60.

Despite API identifying a litany of common issues between KeyBank and

Sporturf, the Trial Court bifurcated Sporturffrom the proceedings. (Id. at 51:1-58:14.)
61.

The Trial Court refused to revisit whether API knowingly and intentionally

waived its right to a jury trial for having failed to read the loan documents. It also did not
revisit whether Keybank waived its ability to strike the jury when it failed to raise the issue
until months after its Answer. (Rec. 21695 at 49: 15-24, 51 :9-13.)
62.

API funded a construction equity account that KeyBank administered. (Rec.

10835.)
63.

This arrangement made KeyBank a fiduciary to API m handling the

construction equity account funds. (Id.)
22
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64.

The loan documents Key Bank authored appointed Key Bank as an "attorney in

fact" to make payments for sums due under the construction contract. (Rec. I 0487, p. 69-70;
API.Ex. 98, 118.)
65.

This attorney in fact relationship imposed a fiduciary duty beyond what would

normally be imputed to a lender in a lender/borrower relationship. (Rec. I 0487, p. 69:2370:7; Rec. I 0831-34.)
lJ9

66.

In its motion to reconsider, API showed KeyBank violated its fiduciary duty

when it failed to release construction draws as promised in the loan documents. (Rec. 1083537.)
67.

The Trial Court refused to grant summary judgment in favor ofKeyBank on

the breach of contract claim. The Trial Court held there was a dispute of fact concerning
whether KeyBank's misrepresentations that Keyes had not approved Draw 6 prompted
Cameo to file its mechanic's lien. (Rec. 10487, p. 11.)
68.

The Trial Court noted API submitted Draw 6 in February 2005, and KeyBank

did not even submit for payment until late April 2005. If viewed in the light most favorable
to API, (as required on summary judgment) this delay was solely the fault ofKeyBank. (Rec.

I 0487, p. 33-34.)
69.

The Trial Court dismissed API's breach of fiduciary duty claim concluding

"that no overarching fiduciary duty exists between a borrower and lender." (Rec. 10487, p.
69.)
70.

The Trial Court limited the scope of a lender's fiduciary duty to its borrower,
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stating there is "a duty to make disbursements as directed by the borrower. In other words,
you can't say, 'Pay Cameo $25,000,' and have the bank pay somebody else. I mean, that
would be, in my mind, a breach of fiduciary duty." (Id.)
71.

In dismissing Plaintif's fiduciary duty claim, the Trial Court limited the scope

"'-

of Keybank's fiduciary duty to payments made from API's equity account to a general
contractor or subcontractors for sums due under the construction contract. (Rec. 10487, p.
72.)
72.

Specifically, the Trial Court limited application of this duty solely to the

management of the $15,000 API paid to Key Bank, thereby refusing to consider its
application to other issues API had raised in opposition to Key Bank's motion. (Id., p. 71.)
73.

The Trial Court dramatically limited AP I's damages when it found KeyBank's

failure to timely fund Draw 6 did not cause API's consequential damages. (Rec. 21695, pp.
3:21-10:13, 23:13-16.)
74.

API claimed the inability to use its indoor field caused a loss ofrevenue. (Rec.

21695, pp. 12:1-13:21; FOF, ,,139, 142.)
(t;;

75.

API claimed the indoor field problems would have been cured if KeyBank

would have disbursed Draw 6 in a timely manner. (FOF, 1139.)
76.

KeyBank defended stating even ifDraw 6 would have been timely funded, the

~

monies made available in that draw would not have been used to fix the defects in the court
and the turf. (Rec. 21965, pp. 13:22-14:6.)
77.

Contemporaneous communications between Cameo and API said that had
24
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Cameo been paid, it would have fixed the indoor field. (Rec. 21965, pp. 19:3-23:16.)
78.

The Trial Court refused to consider the contemporary letters, finding they

would not be admissible at trial even if representatives from Cameo testified about them.
(Id., p. 19:6-22.)
79.

The Trial Court also stated even if these letters came into evidence, the letters

do not suggest "Cameo was going to fix the elevation for nothing." (Id., p. 22:1-4.) The
Trial Court in a summary judgement decision weighed the letter and determined intent. (Id.)
80.
i..:J

At trial, these letters were admitted and Cameo testified as to their meaning.

(Rec. 21704, pp. 160:22-163:2; API.Ex. 372.) This contradicted the Trial Court's earlier
decision that the letters would be inadmissible at trial and could not be considered to prevent
summary judgment. (Rec. 21965, p. 19:6-22.)
81.

Cameo was willing to tear out the concrete floor and re-pour the vapor barrier

at a considerable expense if a reasonable contract settlement was reached. (Rec. 21704, pp.
161:3-10, 13-22.)

82.

Smith also testified concerning the letters that he expected Cameo's lien to be

paid in full as a condition of doing the work related to the concrete floor and the repour. (Id.,
pp. 161:23-162:2, 162:19-163:2.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT:

KeyBank contracted to fund a 12 month construction and 20 year long term loan for
API's indoor athletic facility for $1.9 million. The building was designed to accommodate
multiple sports, but ended up being suitable for baseball-only because of a floor elevation
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problem. Key Bank acted as a fiduciary for API under the loan documents they authored, but
breached their agreement, did not keep interest current, failed to pay the contractor by
funding a loan draw, caused a default ofthe construction contract which resulted in a lien and
litigation, defaulted on providing the long term loan, and interfered with API's ability to

~

obtain replacement long term financing.
Key Bank did not release earmarked funds to pay the interest on the 12 month
construction loan. KeyBank began paying interest from the start as the course of dealing,
then defaulted and penalized API. KeyBank filed a lawsuit to foreclose on API and relied
in part on their failure to pay interest as proof of API's default, attempting to take over API
with a receivership.
KeyBank failed to process and pay Draw 6. Although Draw 6 was repeatedly

~

submitted for payment, Key Bank misplaced it, or discarded it. Four different copies of the
document were admitted at trial. KeyBank lied to the construction contractor, telling him
API did not approve Draw 6 for payment, which resulted in the contractor stopping work and
filing a lien. This caused litigation between API and their contractor. The contractor's claim
was bifurcated and sent to arbitration. Arbitration awarded the contractor approximately $1
million, excused any further obligation to fix or finish work, and found the failure to pay was
a breach of the construction contract. KeyBank caused the default, but was not a party to the
arbitration. Therefore when KeyBank did not pay, API was assigned blame. The $1 million
loss was in addition to arbitration costs, legal fees and other expenses. API lost $1.2 from
KeyBank's failure to pay Draw 6. The contractor did not finish the construction, costing API
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~

an additional approximate $.5 million.
KeyBank did not cooperate with API's effort to obtain replacement long-term
financing. Multiple payoff quotes in varying amounts, including penalties, failure to certify
the funds were properly administered, and demanding more for the payoff than was justified
also damaged API. By the time replacement financing was obtained, API paid over $3. I
million for a $ I .9 million building.
vJ

The Trial Court found KeyBank's delay in asking to strike the jury did not waive the
right to do so. It decided API knowingly and intentionally waived their constitutional right
·..:J

to a jury in boilerplate language of the loan documents. The Trial Court also found as an
undisputed fact API did not read their loan documents before signing. API still had the right
to a jury for parties not signatories to the loan documents, but the Trial Court bifurcated and
trifurcated the case to eliminate a jury from the Key Bank dispute.
The Trial Court granted summary judgment dismissing claims for lost profits,

"

intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud when disputed evidence should have
prevented dismissal.
The trial judge was killed riding his bicycle. API asked for a retrial and the
replacement judge refused.
Although the Trial Court found KeyBank breached their agreements with API, it
concluded KeyBank caused API no damage. This appeal seeks to overturn that decision,
reinstate the case for trial by jury, and allow all claims including those dismissed on summary
judgement to proceed to trial.
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ARGUMENT

I.

Key Bank's Exclusive Control of the API Equity Account and the Parties'
Course of Dealings Obligated Key Bank to Make Interest Payments.

By agreement and course of dealing, KeyBank made automatic interest payments on
the construction loans. (FOF·, ,I,I65-68, 162-168.) "A construction equity account is treated
under the Loan documents as Loan proceeds, such that only KeyBank could approve
disbursements from the construction equity account." (FOF, ,I89.) Jeffrey Breese, the first

~

loan manager, testified interest payments on the construction loan would be taken from the
interest reserve. It was his responsibility to make interest payments. (Rec. 21703, p. 8:4-12,
12:18-13:24.) Interest came from the loan or API's equity account. (Id.) Mr. Breese was
designated as a "fiduciary" on the construction equity account. (Jd., p. 15 :5-7.) Keyes
~

understood KeyBank would withdraw the interest payments as they came due on the loan.
(Rec. 21703A, p. 213:3-15.)
KeyBank made the first 10 automatic interest payments, (Rec. 21705, p. 168:3-6.)
never asking for payments from APL Bank statements for the Construction Equity Account
were sent to Breese's office at "999 N. Hillfield Road, Layton, Utah 84041-2385." (API.Ex.
706-718.) When KeyBank fired Breese, Melvin Miller, became the second loan manager and
also paid th.e interest. (Rec. 21702, p. 14:3-15:7.). The I I th interest payment (May 4, 2005)
was paid by KeyBank using an API check payment and a debit to the Construction Equity
Account. 4 (Rec. 21705,p. 168:7-18.)
4

The automatic interest payments were only due during the construction phase of the
loan. Had the construction phase gone according to schedule, it would have lasted from July
28
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

KeyBank breached its contract by defaulting on automatic interest payments. The
remaining interest payments 12-24 (June 2005 through November 2005) were made by APL
(Id., p. 169:4-24.) KeyBank employee Sharon Troszak promised automatic interest payments

would still be withdrawn automatically. (Rec. 201 I 8-20169, 1194.) When API received a
Notice of Default showing unpaid interest through May 9, 2006, despite the Troszak
instructions, API paid $86,099. IO to bring the interest current. Troszak instructed Keyes not
to make a payment in the future. (API.Ex. 478,667,322,325,334, 335, 342; KB.Ex. 225,
KB05908-9,59 l 3,5976.)
~

On August 23, 2004, Richard S. Piechowski sent an email to Jeffrey Breese inquiring
about the interest payments due under the loan. (API.Ex. 153, KB5659.) Breese responded,
"I need to pay this from the construction line, but I did not receive the statement. How much
is due and I will pay it asap." Id. On the same day, Breese authorized an interest payment
advance from the construction loan for $513.25. (API.Ex. 154.) On September 27, 2004,
Piechowski again notified Breese about delinquent interest payments.

(API.Ex. 183,

KB5680.) Breese advised Piechowski that he would take the interest payments from the
VP

construction loan. (API.Ex. 184.) Piechowski notified Breese the interest payments were
$828.54 on Loan #10001 and $39.80 on Loan #2. (API.Ex. 193, KB5682.) Breese made
another interest payment from the loan on October 4, 2004. (API.Ex. 186, KB5685; API.Ex.
672, KB3638-3639.) API did not know how much interest was due, nor how to calculate it.
2004 through July 2005, at which time the KeyBank and the SBA permanent financing would
replace it. 11 of the 12 interest payments were automatically deducted by KeyBank. Thus,
92% of the planned interest payments were automatically deducted by KeyBank.
29
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KeyBank's failure to pay interest was a breach of the loan barring KeyBank from claiming
any advantage from the loan documents.

II.

The Trial Court Erred in Finding That KeyBank Did Not Commit Bad
Faith, Breach its Fiduciary Duty to API, or Breach the Loan Documents
When it Failed to Pay Draw 6, Failed to Cooperate with API During the
Refinance Process, and Failed to Provide API Promised Long Term Loan
Financing.

A.

KeyBank Committed Bad Faith and Breached its Fiduciary Duty
by Failing to Pay Draw 6.

The .facts are irreconcilable with the Trial Court's finding KeyBank's failure to
disburse Draw 6 was not a breach, bad faith, and contrary to its fiduciary duty. The Trial
Court found no fiduciary breach despite KeyBank's deliberate and unjustified delay in
funding Draw 6. KeyBank directly caused construction liens and delays, a halt in
construction, and breached their commitment for a 20 year loan. The Trial Court limited any
damages relating to a breach of fiduciary duty to only damages from the failure to replace the
stolen $15,000!
A fiduciary or confidential relationship arises not just by contract, but equity will
imply a higher duty in a relationship when the trusting party has been induced to relax the
care and v1gilance he would ordinarily exercise. Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica,
Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). "Every business transaction involves a certain amount

of trust and confidence." Renshaw v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 87 Utah 364 ( 1935). In a
similar case, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held when a bank consents to disburse loan
proceeds and personal funds of the borrower, the bank becomes the agent of the borrower
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and owes a duty of due care to assure the funds are paid for the work actually done. First Nat.
Bankv. Wernhart, 555 N.W.2d 819,823 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). The Wisconsin Court noted:

An agency relationship results from the manifestation of control by one person
to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and
consent by the other so to act. Restatement (Second) ofthe Law ofAgency § 1
at 7 ( 1958). Here, in addition to the parties' agreement to allow the bank to pay
out the mortgage proceeds, the bank also consented to act W1 their behalf in the
disbursement of Wernharts' personal funds to the contractor. We think these
facts mean that the bank assumed the role of the We~ert's agent, and
assumed the accompanying duties as well. All agents owe their principal a
fiduciary duty with respect to matters within the scope of their agency.

Id. at 828 ( citations omitted).
A "fiduciary" is "one who owes to another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence,
and candor." Black's Law Dictionary (8th edition, 2004 ). Fiduciaries owe a high standard
of care to principals. Freegard v. First Western Nat. Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah
1987). KeyBank disbursed loan funds as a fiduciary. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701

P.2d 795, 799-800 (Utah 1985).
"In Utah, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is an independent tort that, on occasion,
arises from a contractual duty." Norman v. Arnold, 57 P.3d 997, 1006 (Utah 2002)(citations
omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 cmt. b ( 1979) (" A fiduciary who
commits a breach of his duty as a fiduciary is guilty of tortious conduct to the person for
whom he should act."); D'Elia v. Rice Development, 147 P.3d 515, 523 (Ut. App.
2006). "The general rule is that punitive damages cannot be awarded for a breach of
contract." Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co., 660 P.2d 229,232 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted).
Punitive damages are, however, allowed "where the breach of contract amounts to an
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independent tort." Id. (citations omitted). Breach of fiduciary duty is an independent tort that
occasionally arises from a contractual duty, and can serve as the basis for punitive damages.

See Campbellv. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co.65 P.3d 1134, 1150-51 (Utah 200l)(citations
omitted).

l:..

Breach of a fiduciftry duty relationship supports a large award of punitive damages.

Id., see also See Brown v. Coates, 253 F .2d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (holding that punitive
damages are particularly appropriate when a fiduciary duty is disregarded and exploited for
gain). Therefore, because the claim for breach of fiduciary duty was not dismissed, punitive
damages should have been considered. The Trial Court erred by limiting damages to interest
on the $15,000 taken by KeyBank. (Rec. 10487, p. 72:16-20.)
A fiduciary relationship between a lender and borrower exists when there is "actual

~

placing of trust and confidence in fact by one party in another and a great disparity of
position and influence between the parties to the action." Ruebsamen v. Maddocks, 340 A.2d
31, 35 (Me. 1975). "Fiduciary relationship" is a broad term embracing technical fiduciary and
informal relations wherever one person trusts or relies upon another. Lowery v. Guaranty

Bank a'!-d Trust Co., 592 So.2d 79, 83 (Miss. 1991) (citations omitted).
In Utah, a fiduciary relationship exists in a lending situation. In Bennett v. Huish, 155
P. 3d 917 (Utah App. 2007), the court upheld a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Huish,
who assisted the borrower in obtaining financing. Huish converted the borrower's extension
fees, told the borrower he would hold certain loan proceeds and return them if not used for
~

future extension fees, failed to disclose his commission from the lender, and did not use the
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funds as promised, and benefitted himself at the expense of the borrower. Id. at 92728. KeyBank's actions are similar to Huish. Many facts should have prevented the Trial Court
from limiting breach of fiduciary duty to the $15,000.
In Utah, a confidential relationship is presumed between an attorney and a client.
~

Baker v. Pattee, 684 P .2d 632, 636 (Utah 1984). Likewise, a confidential relationship is
created when a party is appointed as an attorney-in-fact. Grubb v. Grubb, 630 S.E.2d 746,
754 (Va. 2006) (Attorney in fact creates a confidential relationship where the attorney in fact
owes a fiduciary duty); Mantella v Mantella, 268 A.D.2d 852, 852 (3d Dept 2000) ("[A]
~

power of attorney ... is clearly given with the intent that the attorney-in-fact will utilize that
power for the benefit of the principal.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Because "[t]he relationship of an attorney-in-fact to his principal is that of agent and
principal ... , the attorney in-fact must act in the utmost good faith and undivided loyalty
toward the principal, and must act in accordance with the highest principles of morality,
fidelity, loyalty and fair dealing." Semmler v Naples,166 A.D.2d 751, 752 (3d Dept
l 990)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Construction Loan Agreement appointed KeyBank as API's attorney-in-fact.
(API.Ex. 98, p. 4; API.Ex.118, p. 4 (Under "Payments" paragraph.) This authorized
KeyBank to make advances in the joint names of API and the general contractor,
subcontractor(s), or supplier(s) in payment of sums due under the contract. Id. KeyBank was
authorized to make payments directly to the general contractor and subcontractors under the
construction contract. Id. The attorney in fact was irrevocable and survived default. Id.
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ln its Findings of Fact 26-29, 36-42, 101-103, 131-133~ 138-139, 150, 156, and 208
the Trial Court found the Draw Process Overview prepared by KeyBank and signed by API
and the contractor was part of the loan. It required payment within 5 to 7 days ofa request.
Draw 6 was submitted on February 18, 2005 and resubmitted repeatedly by API from then
until April 19. There were at least four non-identical copies of Draw No. 6 as exhibits at
trial. KeyBank mishandled the submission. On April 27 Vice-President Roger Preston sent
a copy of Draw 6 for payment with a cover sheet which stated: "Drew, I blew this! I thought
l sent it last week. Anything you can do to expedite would be greatly appreciated. Thanks!"
(FOF, 1133.) The construction contractor tired of waiting and two days later contacted
Preston on April 29 to ask if API had approved Draw 6. Preston said API had not approved
it, even though APl had both approved and repeatedly attempted to have it paid. On May 4
the contractor filed a lien. (Rec. 20525-26, 20527-28, 20551, 20556-58, 20575-76.) The
Trial Court found none of these events damaged APl, even though it resulted in litigation
between API and their contractor.
The Trial Court found the Draw Process Overview was not an express contract, but
created expectations protected by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Trial
Court concluded KeyBank handled Draw 6 unreasonably, but that did not damage API and
therefore did not matter. (FOF, 1209, p. 56.)
The conclusion there was no damage to API from KeyBank's failure to pay Draw 6
is irreconcilable with other findings. The Trial Court found (I) API's insistence upon
reserving its claim to consequential damages and (2) construction defects were the causes of
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API damages, not KeyBank's unreasonable delay in handling Draw 6. The time line found
by the Trial Court is clear that KeyBank's failure to fund Draw 6 was the cause of conflict
between Cameo and API, and caused damages.
VJ

If Draw 6 had been paid timely, the Midwest Excavating and Cameo liens would
never have been filed. Cameo first signed Draw 6 on February 18, 2005. Mr. Keyes
promptly submitted it to KeyBank. (Rec. 20527, 20556-58.) The Midwest lien was filed
March 29, 2005, nearly six weeks after Draw 6 was submitted for payment. (Rec. 20527.)
The Cameo lien was filed May 4, 2005, nearly 90 days after Cameo signed and submitted
payment to API and cmly days after KeyBank's vice-president told Cameo API had not
approved payment. (Rec. 20528.) KeyBank falsely 5 stated its reason for denying approval

vJ

for Draw 6 was the Midwest lien. (Id.) Had Draw 6 been paid promptly when submitted,
the Midwest lien could never have been filed.
The Trial Court improperly speculated about events months after KeyBank should

~

have paid Draw 6. It speculates events in April, May, July, September, and October 2005
may have happened even ifKeyBank paid in February. (FOF, 11143-155.) Had KeyBank
~

paid, the dispute would have involved approximately $75,000, not $308,000, and the parties
never would have spent a million dollars in attorney fees for that dispute. (KB.Ex. 127.)

~

Events of April - October 2005 would have been altogether different if KeyBank had paid.

VP
5

No contemporary document refers to this as a cause. Only after KeyBank's breach
was the Midwest lien filed.
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The Trial Court used disagreements from April to October 2005 caused by
nonpayment, to support its speculation that nonpayment on Draw 6 was unimportant. (Id.)

~

In February and March 2005 nothing was called a "defect". API's architect, Mr. Naylor, sent
correspondence to Cameo regarding a "list of problems" with the facility and the time of

~

construction. (KB.Ex. 33.) Mr. Naylor testified sending a "punchlist" (items to be corrected)
prior to final completion is commonplace in every construction project. (Rec. 21700, p.
49:22-50:7.) Five months later, July 2005, when it was clear KeyBank would never pay,
API finally made demand for consequential damages for construction defects and delays.
(FOF, 1151.) This was a substitute plan for dealing with KeyBank's nonfunding. Without
the loan API could pay nothing and was forced to seek an offset. The parties negotiated for
three more months, until October 2005, (while API tried to get KeyBank to pay under the

~

loan). ButKeyBank did not pay and Cameo filed to foreclose. (FOF, 1155.) The Trial Court
erred by using hindsight to question causation and damages.

B.

Failure to Cooperate With AP] During the Refinance Process.

Key Bank delayed API's efforts to obtain refinancing. Beginning in August 2006, API
needed a payoff to provide the SBA and other financial institutions for alternative long term
financing. KeyBank's refusal to provide long term financing was a breach.
To replace defaulting KeyBank, API required a payoff and an SBA certification.
Every day of delay increased interest, fees, penalties, and attorney fees. Every day of delay
changed the available interest rates.

Delay created more problems with the general

contractor. The duty of good faith and fair dealing required KeyBank to reasonably assist
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~

APL

KeyBank should have at least completed the SBA certification showing how the

construction loan was disbursed. (Rec. 21699, p. 112 :4-113 :6.) They failed to do so, costing
time and money. KeyBank failed to certify because Section 2.2 (Cost Certification) required
KeyBank to confirm expenditures and sources of funds were true and correct and used only
for the APl facility. Midwest's $1,022 mechanic's lien would not prevent KeyBank from
making this certification. (Rec. 6071-7162, Ex. 55 p.126:5-10.) Neither would a dispute
between APl and Cameo. (Id. at 136:11-17.) But KeyBank could not certify because
$15,000 had been removed from Key Bank's fiduciary account and not used for construction.
KeyBank did not want to certify their misconduct. The standard in the industry and the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires good faith and prompt payoff
~

information whenever requested. (APl.Ex. 869, Op. Three.)

C.

Key Bank Demanded More Than was Due to Payoff the
Construction Loan.

The payoff amounts quoted by KeyBank included amounts never borrowed by API,
penalties caused by KeyBank's breach, attorney fees incurred by KeyBank in investigating
their misconduct, and other inappropriate charges outlined in Mark Hashimoto's report. The
payoff amount did not give any credit for the theft/fraudulent taking of the $15,000 from
August 2006 until December 26, 2006. The $100,000 escrowed funds held by KeyBank was
required to be paid a second time by KeyBank. KeyBank's attorney Scott Brown belatedly
extended an option on March 12, 2007 to reduce the payoffby $100,000. {API.Ex. 651.) By
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then if API took the offer it would have delayed refinancing and risked a default judgment
KeyBank was aggressively pursuing in this case.
Although amounts are in dispute, the breach of KeyBank is not. The mishandled
$ I 00,000 only reappeared after the MACU long term loan had been approved. KeyBank
made refinancing nearly impossible, and only when API succeeded anyway did KeyBank
relent and acknowledged they had no right to the additional $ I 00,000. These actions by
KeyBank interfered with APl's ability to obtain replacement financing. They damaged API
by causing them to incur unnecessary additional penalties, interest, and fees.
The standard in the industry and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
requires a good faith and prompt payoff information whenever requested. (API.Ex. 869, Op.
Three.) KeyBank failed to give this. Failure to provide a prompt payoff interferes with any
party's refinancing efforts. KeyBank demanded a payoff total of $2,046,242. They had
advanced only $1,649,055 on the loans. (API.Ex. 867, p. 2; 868.)
From KeyBank's perspective, this was an extraordinarily profitable venture. They
advanced$1,649,055 andgotback$2,l 88,278.90. (API.Ex. 672, KB03638-3643.) API paid
Cameo $1,180,117.00 during the contract, and another $608,491.90 as a result of an
arbitration award for a total of $1,788,608.90.
Mountain America Credit Union gave a loan for $1,650,000, out of which $50,000
was charged as fees, for a net of$1,600,000. (API.Ex. 867, p. 4; 868.)
After the construction was abandoned by Cameo, and as a part of the permanent
financing, API paid a total of $2,654,733.90 to KeyBank ($2,188,278.90) and Cameo
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0&,,

($608,491.90)6 but received long term financing from MACU of only $1,600,000. The
difference was $1,054,733.90 which required cash. Mr. Keyes has sold or borrowed against
everything he owns and now owes hard-money lenders over $2,000,000.
From API's perspective this was an extraordinarily unprofitable venture. They had
no choice but to sell, mortgage and encumber everything using unconventional as well as
conventional sources. In addition to MACU's loan, and selling his father's home, Mr. Keyes
incurred hard money loans from Dana McMullin totaJing $700,000 principal and Kevin
Gates totaling $100,000 principal.

III.

vJ

Key Bank's Mishandling of Draw 6 and its Employee's Misrepresentation
to Cameo, and its Subsequent Refusal to Fund Constructions due to Liens
Caused APl's Damages.

The Trial Court's conclusion there was no causation or damage to API from
KeyBank's delay in processing Draw 6 is wholly irreconcilable with its findings. It found ( 1)
API's insistence upon reserving its claim to consequential damages and (2) construction
defects were the causes of API damages, not KeyBank's unreasonable delay in handling
Draw 6. (FOF 154) However, when viewing the event timeline, it is clear KeyBank's failure
to fund Draw 6 caused conflict between Cameo and APL
A.

KeyBank's Mishandling of Draw 6 and Mr.
Misrepresentation Prompted Cameo to File Its Lien.

6

Preston's

API paid $2,654,733.90 for an unfinished athletic facility. It took another halfmillion to finish the building when they lost their contractor. The $1.9 million project cost
API $3.1 million with interest now accruing on hard money loans.
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The Trial Court acknowledged no legal significan~e to KeyBank's three month delay
in processing Draw 6 comprising the lion's share of Cameo's lien. The decision ignores actual
events to speculate on how it might have unfolded even if Draw 6 had been funded. The
Trial Court also ignored the effect of Mr. Preston's lie. It attached no significance in the

~

timing between Mr. Preston's lie and Cameo's lien a few days after. The conclusion ignores
API's _financially crippling position.
Cameo claimed it needed to file a lien on May 4th • Even if true, the amount of the lien
would have been insignificant. Further, under Utah law then in effect, a contractor must file
a lien within 180 days after the day on which final completion occurred. U.C.A. § 38-17(1 )(a)(i)(A)(2007)7. On May 4 Cameo had not even begun punch list fixes. As late as June
and September, Cameo repeatedly acknowledged that construction was still outstanding. The

~

time for filing had not yet begun on May 4th •

B.

The Trial Court's Finding that Draw No. 8 Prompted Litigation is
Complete Conjecture.

The Trial Court attributed Cameo filing suit to a letter from API's architect in August
2005 in which he refused to certify Draw 8 (for retention)! (FOF, 1154.) AUGUST! Not

~

KeyBank's failure to fund 6 from February, or ever! Not KeyBank's failure to pay 7! This
finding evaded any meaningful analysis ofKeyBank's mishandling of draws, and excused
KeyBank from any liability of API's damages. This finding is clearly erroneous.

7

Alternatively, the lien had to be recorded within 90 days of the Notice of Completion
filing date. U.C.A. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i)(B)(2007). API is unaware of any Notice of Completion
having ever been filed.
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~

Cameo had ceased construction long before API's refusal to certify Draw 8, on March
14, 2005, when it delayed working on punch list items. Draw 8 is unlike Draws 6 and 7,
which were to compensate Cameo for work already completed. In contrast, Draw 8, the
retention, was security to ensure completion of punch list items. Even if API approved of
all the draws (which it did)8, KeyBank still refused to disperse because of liens from
KeyBank's failure to fund.

C.

KeyBank's Failure to Pay Draw 6 Caused an Increased Damages
Award Against API in Favor of Cameo by the Amount of Draw 6.

Arbitration awarded Cameo damages and attorney's fees because Cameo was excused
from performance when APJ refused to pay. The arbitrator refused to admit evidence of
KeyBank's mishandling of Draw 6 and subsequent refusal to pay 6, 7 or 8. Consequently,
API was damaged in the arbitration award for KeyBank's failure to fund. KeyBank was the
gatekeeper to the funds. Anything KeyBank did that prevented API access to the funds
vJ

damaged APL Had KeyBank timely funded Draw 6, Cameo would have received over half
the damages sought in arbitration. No one can say API was not damaged in this amount.

IV.

The Trial Court erred in denying API's request for a jury trial.
A.

Right to Trial by Jury Generally.

Juries in civil cases are·guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. It is integral to our
system of justice. Christenson v. Diversified Builders, Inc., 331 F.2d 992, 994 (10th Cir.)

~

8

It is also worth noting that in the September 15, 2005 letter Cameo acknowledged
that API had certified both Draws 6 and 7, yet both remained unpaid, showing API's ability
to pay is beyond API's discretion. (FOF, 1154).
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cert denied; 379 U.s·. 843 (1964). The Utah Supreme Court has declared: "A right so
fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether guaranteed by the Constitution or provided
by statute, should be jealously guarded by the courts." Butz v. Union Pac. R.R., 233 P .2d
332,337 (Utah 1951). In Stickle v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 251 P.2d 867,871 (Utah 1952), they

le..

stated "we remain cognizant of the vital importance of the privilege of trial by jury in our
system ofjustice and deem it our duty to zealously protect and preserve it." API had a right
to a jury.
The Seventh Amendment gives the right to jury trial on issues of fact even in suits for
breach of contract. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. 50
(1982); Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Because the right is fundamental, there is a presumption against waiver and "courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver." Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash,
301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); see, e.g., Medical Air Tech. Corp. v. Marwan Investment, Inc.,
303 F .3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2002) (presumption against waiver), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1111
(2003); Winter v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 199 F .3d 399, 408 n. 11 (7th Cir. 1999)
(same); Wauhop v. Allied Humble Bank, N.A., 926 F.2d 454, 455 (5th Cir. 1991) (same);

Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 1986) (same); National Equip.
Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255,258 (2d Cir. 1977) (same). API was not allowed the
presumption.
The right can only be relinquished knowingly and intentionally. Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938). Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Aetna
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Insurance, 301 U.S. at 393. Those seeking to enforce the waiver have a very heavy burden
of proving a party knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally waived their right. Dreiling v.

Peugot Motors ofAmerica, 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982); 4 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §
73. Ambiguity in a contract is construed against the drafter, KeyBank. Nielsen v. O'Reilly,
8848 P.2d 664, 666 (Utah 1992).

B.

"'

The Jury Waiver Should not be Enforced Because the Waiver is
Overbroad.

"Courts have considered a number of factors to determine whether a contractual
waiver of the right to a jury was knowing and voluntary." Cooperative Fin..Ass'n, Inc. v.

Garst, 871 F. Supp. 1168, 1172 (N.D. Iowa 1995). "They have considered whether the
waiver provision is on a standardized form agreement or newly-drafted document, in fine
print or in large or bold print, set off in a paragraph of its own, in a take-it-or-leave-it or
negotiated contract, and the length of the contract." Id. (citing cases). "They have also
VJP

considered whether the waiving party was represented by counsel, whether the waiving party
was a sophisticated business person aware of the consequences of the waiver, whether the
parties were manifestly unequal in bargaining power, and whether there was an opportunity
to review all of the terms of the contract and whether the waiving party did so." Id. Waiver
must be clearly apparent in the contract and its language must be unambiguous and
unequivocal, leaving no room for doubt as to the intention of the parties. 47 Am. Jur. 2d,
Jury§ 72.
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KeyBank's clause reads "Lender and Borrower hereby waive the right to any jury trial
in any action, proceeding, or counterclaim brought by either Lender or Borrower against the
other." (Rec. 2223-25.) This language extends to any future, past, or present dealings
between these parties. It extends to eliminate the constitutional right to a jury in any criminal

~

circumstance where these parties are involved. It would require the waiver of a jury in a case
between KeyBank and any person unfortunate enough to borrow from them, no matter when
or why the case is filed. It would waive a jury between them for decades.
C.

API did not Knowingly or Voluntarily Waive Its Right to a Jury.

In order to protect their right to a jury, API filed a Motion to Reinstate Jury on April
21, 2009. KeyBank admitted "Keyes did not read the Commitment Letter or the Loan
Documents before he signed them." (Rec. 4944-5039, Fact No. 25.) KeyBank admitted it
was undisputed "Keyes testified that he had intended to have his attorney David Overholt
review the Loan Documents, but that his attorney was out of town at the time." (Id. at Fact
No. 26.) Even after signing them, he did not read them; KeyBank admits: "After he signed
the documents, Keyes testified he simply 'put them in the file in the de·aI."' (Id. at Fact No.
27.) The Court found it is undisputed Mr. Keyes did not read the loan documents prior to
signing them. (Rec. 10487, p. 6:23-7:12.)
If the documents containing the jury waiver were not read, then the clause
relinquishing the right to jury could not have been knowingly and intentionally waived.
The jury waiver is contained in fine print at the end of several form agreements.
Where a jury waiver is set inconspicuously in the contract, the jury waiver fails to overcome
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\;;JP

the presumption against enforcement. National Equip. Rental, 565 F .2d at 258 (citations
omitted).
Where a party does not have any choice but to accept the contract as written if he
wants to obtain the loan, coupled with the gross inequality in bargaining power, it
undermines the waiver was neither knowing nor intentional. Id.

When Keyes asked

Key Bank if API's counsel should review the contracts, Key Bank responded that any changes
to the agreements would kill the deal. (Rec.20118-20169, 165; Rec. 4944-5039, Fact No.
26.) Mr. Keyes had NO bargaining position. It was a 'take it or leave it' situation, where
APl's business depended upon the construction financing from KeyBank. Finally, KeyBank
never objected to a jury until the pleadings were closed and the matter had bee_n pending for

IO months. (Rec. 23 88-91 ).
Despite this evidence, the Trial Court entered its Order Denying Motion to Reinstate
Jury and Granting Motion to Bifurcate Third-Party claims Against Sporturf, Inc., stating "The
Motion to Reinstate Jury is denied[.]" (Rec. 16244-16246, 1 1.) There were no findings
made. The Trial Court should have allowed API to have a jury in this case. It was a right
that API never intentionally, knowingly, or voluntarily waived.

D.

The Trial Court Erred In Bifurcating Sporturf Prejudiced API in
Depriving It of a Jury on the Issues Common Between KeyBank,
Sporturf, and API.

The Trial Court's denial of a jury trial involved a series of rulings. In February 201 I,
after refusing to reinstate the jury on API's urging, the Trial Court acknowledged API had
~

preserved its right to a jury for Sporturf. The issues common to API, KeyBank, and Sporturf
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were not limited to the single issue oflost profits, but the Trial Court limited it solely to API's
claim for lost profits. When the Trial Court granted summary judgment to KeyBank on the
lost profits issue in 2011, it also sua sponte renewed and granted Sporturfs 2009 motion to
bifurcate. Thus, at trial, KeyBank did not face a jury. If it was error as a matter of law to
summarily dispose of API's lost profit claims, the error was not harmless since it deprived
API of its right to a jury.

V.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on APl's Claims
for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Lost Profits, and Fraud.

Summary judgment required the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(c). The court must make a11 reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party. Davis County v. Jensen, 83 P.3d 405,406 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). "A district court is
precluded from granting summary judgment 'if the facts shown by the evidence on a
summary judgment motion support more than one plausible but conflicting inference on a
pivotal issue in the case."' Uintah Basic Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 179 P.3d 786, 790 (Utah 2008).
APl was "entitled to the benefit of having the court consider all of the facts presented, and
every inference fairly arising therefrom in the light most favorable to [them]." Morris v.

Farnsworth Motel, 259 P.2d 297,298 (Utah 1953). This did not happen.
A.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim. ·

For intentional infliction of emotional distress, API was required to show KeyBank
acted "(a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or (b) where any reasonable
personal would have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as
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t.t.

to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted
standards of decency and morality." Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344, 347
( 1961 ). "Pecuniary loss as the result of breach of contract almost invariably causes some
form and degree of mental distress." Smith v. Hoyer, 697 P.2d 761, 764 (Colo. App. 1984).
Generally, recovery for emotional disturbance will be disallowed unless the contractual
breach also caused bodily harm, or a breach is of such a kind that_ serious emotional

vu
. disturbance was a particularly likely result. Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 353.
However, in breach of contract cases, damages for emotional distress can be
~

recoveredif there is also an independent intentional tort, Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Veasley,
610 Sp.2d 290, 295 (Miss. I 992), or where the breach was accompanied by willful and

vP

wanton conduct, Smith, 697 P.2d at 764. In Smith, the court affirmed damages for mental
anguish against a bank and its officers for willful and wanton conduct accompanying a
breach of contract. Id. Plaintiffs, a corporation and its president, sued the bank, its vice
president over construction lending, and a loan officer for breach of contract after defendants
failed to honor an oral promise of extension of time to repay construction loans. Defendant

VP

had a financing arrangement with plaintiffs. When plaintiffs asked for an extension of time
for construction for personal issues, the defendants consented. Before the time extension
expired, the loan officer informed the bank the loans were in default and the bank instructed
plaintiffto pay or face foreclosure. The bank instituted foreclosure proceedings and the court
allowed the mental anguish claim to proceed. Id.
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Ct.

The Trial Court erred when it ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of
KeyBank on API's claim for Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress (IIED) because there
were genuine issues of material fact. (Rec. I 8551-18553.) In it's first ruling addressing
IIED, the Trial Court noted that"[ w ]ith respect to claim 3 (Intentional Infliction ofEmotional

Ce

Distress), the Motion to Dismiss is denied. The Court notes in particular that the allegations
of paragraph 124 of the Counterclaim presents issues which a jury would have to decide, and
the Court cannot say as a matter of law this conduct is not outrageous or shocking." (Rec.
2008-2012, 12(C).) These "issues" in the Counterclaim included KeyBank's refusal to pay
Draw 6, refusal to cooperate in refinancing efforts, (Rec. 1815-1891,

1 124.)

Later,

KeyBank moved for summary judgment on the IIED claims, and the Trial Court found
KeyBank's actions were "insufficiently outrageous" to allow the claims to be presented to a
jury. It ruled, "there is not an allegation of sufficiently outrageous conduct to give rise to a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress."

(Rec. 2 I 697, p. 43 :22-44: I).

However, there were facts precluding summary judgment.
First, KeyBank failed to fund the loan. API provided proofKeyBank failed to submit
or lost Draw 6 on multiple occasions and lied to Cameo about Mr. Keyes not approving
payment.

API provided the Deposition of Mr. Keyes, the Deposition of Mr. Miller

(KeyBank's employee), the Deposition ofRobin Andersen, and the Affidavit of Clark Smith
(Cameo's controller). (Rec. 1053 7A-10824, Ex. 4, 13, 14, 17, 18). A jury should have
decided. The error is glaring where one of the issues at trial was KeyBank's failure to fund
Draw 6 in a timely manner. (FOF, ,13 I, 138). On that issue the Trial Court found, "[t]he
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~.

facts set forth above suggest an unreasonable delay in processing Draw Request No. 6."
l.ia

(FOF, 1209).
Second, API alleged Key Bank failed to cooperate with API's replacement financing.
While API attempted to replace the long term loan, KeyBank interfered. They refused to
certify the SBA 504 loan program, which was required for refinancing. KeyBank wrongly
raised the payoff amount by $125,000.00, then mis-accounted API's $100,000.00 deposit.
(Rec. 1053 7A-10824, Ex. 4, p. 227 ;~-229:23; Ex. 6, p. 70:20-25; Ex. 16, p. 81 :6-15).
KeyBank's interference with refinancing precluded summary dismissal of the IIED claim.

V}J

Finally, API presented evidence of KeyBank stalking Keyes, his family going into
hiding because they felt threatened, serious stress-related health issues, financial ruin, and
threats from KeyBank. Mr. Keyes' stress related health issues included anxiety, loss of sleep,
stress cough, a stress-related eye-infection, and depression symptoms (Rec. 10537A-10824,
Ex. 7, p. 19:1-20:16; p. 36:2-18). KeyBank forced Mr. Keyes to the brink of financial ruin,

VP

causing the sale of his father's house, making his father homeless. 9 (Id. p. 70:24-25; Ex. 4,

p. 228:23-25). KeyBank employees threatened "we sue people for a living" and that they
would "depose l 000 people to dig up some dirt on Mr. Keyes" ifhe commenced legal action
against KeyBank. (Id., Ex. 28, p. 46:25-47:1-15; Ex. 20, p. 18:2-3).
The Trial Court should not have granted summary judgment on the IIED claims
because of genuine issues of material fact.

9

His father came to live at Mr. Keyes' home and died shortly afterwards.
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B.

Lost Profits Claims.

The Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment on API's claims for lost profits
because there were genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.
The Trial court denied the KeyBank April 30, 2008 summary judgment on API's

~

breach of contract claim, finding "[t]here's at least a question of fact with respect to whether
Key Bank [sic] acted in accordance with the draw process overview." (Rec. 10487, p. 11: 1921 ). It found, "there is a question of fact [to prevem summary judgment] about whether Key
Bank [sic] acted reasonably in responding, and in accordance with the agreement, in
responding to draw request No. 6." (Id., 13:4-6.)
KeyBank again on May 29, 2009 moved for summary judgment on breach of contract
and lost profits.

API presented evidence Cameo supervised API's contractors, was

responsible for the elevation differential, and would have repaired the elevation if paid Draw
6. (Rec. 6071-7162). The Trial Court granted summary judgment on lost profits and
dismissed the First, Second, Third, and Sixth Causes "to the extent that the API Parties seek
a recovery of lost profits pursuant to any such claims." (Rec. 16255-16267, 11 1, 2.) The
Trial Court ignored the evidence, interpreted and weighed evidence, and construed facts in
a light most favorable to KeyBank. (Rec. 16274-16383, Ex. 1, p. 7:10-8:4.)
API presented testimony from JeffHenderson, a subcontractor, who testified Cameo's
superintendant, Brock Vigil, directed no cement be underlying the turf, that Mr. Henderson
was to install the substrate material, and the elevation should be two inches below the
concrete. (Rec. 15346-15449, Ex. 6, pp. 33-36.) Vigil of Cameo inspected and directed Mr.
50
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Henderson's work. (Id. at p. 36:5-6.) Vigil of Cameo raked in the backfi]I with Henderson,
leveled the backfill around the basketball court area, and accepted Mr. Henderson's work,
saying, "Okay. That's good to go." (Id. at p. 36:5-22.) Russ Naylor, the project architect
vJ

testified Cameo was paid to supervise all work. (Id., Ex. 7 at ,r 6.)
Cameo had a contract to fix the elevation issues, and acknowledged it as a punch-list
item.

In April, 2005, Cameo admitted "[ w ]e have suggested pulling back IO' and

l.j

transitioning up to each of the slabs/doors with sand. We have also suggested removing and
replacing the bathroom entry slabs to ease that transition." (Id., Ex. 2, p. 4.) In a follow-up
letter by Mr. Keyes to Cameo, Robert Keyes wrote:

vi

After we met a couple of weeks ago you ask [sic] me to tell you what I would
like Cameo to do with the [concrete slab for the basketball] court. Given the
situation concerning the existing concrete court slab, turf area, annex entry
way, and the lock rooms entry elevations are all incorrect ... this proposal only
covers a possible solution to my court nightmare that would hopefully bring
this portion of the building to with in [an] acceptable design perimeter so that
I may have full use of my building.

(Id., Ex. 11.) Keyes expected Cameo to repair the problem. (Id.) Cameo responded,
"[Cameo is] willing to [tear out the concrete and re-pour it] at considerable expense if a
reasonable contract settlement can be reached in the next few days." (Id., Ex. 4.) Cameo was
willing to repair the problem. Cameo agreed it would do so if Draw 6 was paid. Cameo's
v)

letter to Naylor states "Cameo reaffirms that it remains ready, willing and able to perform any
corrective work (subject to receipt of payment as outlined in this letter)." (Id., Ex. 5.) Robin
Andersen testified Cameo refused to proceed with punch-list items, or corrective work, until

~

it received payment on Draw 6. (Id., Ex. 14, p. 65:1-12.) Cameo admitted during arbitration
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it offered to promptly remedy these issues [sport court and flooring] "in exchange for
payment of the two past due pay requests and a Jetter stating he [Mr. Keyes] would release
the final retention upon completing of this punch list work." (Rec. 16274-16383, Ex. 2, Ex.
3, p. 17:18-19:25.) Smith testified Cameo would repair the court, and "would not only fix
the court, but [it] would extend it off, get rid of the drop off, take care of all of that concrete
work all at our expense." (Id., Ex. 4, p. 28:5-19.)
API presented evidence Cameo was willing to make repairs. That should have
prevented summary judgment. (Rec. I 6236-1623 8). The Trial Court disregarded the proof
as "inadmissible" but at trial admitted and relied on the same documents. (API.Ex. 372, 408.)
Later the Trial Court relied on the same evidence in its Findings of Fact. (FOF, ,II 54.)
Summary judgment was improper, and resulted from construing evidence in the light most
favorable to KeyBank.

C.

Fraud.

For constructive fraud, Utah requires only "two elements: (i) a confidential
relationship between the parties; and (ii) a failure to disclose material facts." Jensen v. JHC

Hosps., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) (emphasis added). There is no requirement to
establish damages.

API had a confidential relationship when KeyBank designated

themselves as the "fiduciary" over API's funds. API had no signature authority on the funds.
As fiduciary KeyBank was required to insure funds were used solely for construction of the
baseball facility and no other purpose. KeyBank breached that duty by allowing $15,000 to
go to a bank Vice-President. KeyBank failed to disclose and worked to conceal these facts
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vJ

from API. They say they concealed the facts because they considered Keyes a "suspect."
Keyes had no authority to make withdrawals, nor did he receive the Construction Equity
Account statements. This claim was wrongly dismissed on summary judgment.
Rule 59 of the URCP allows a new trial: "(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues,
for any of the following causes ... ( 1) Irregularity in the proceeds of the court,jury or adverse
party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial." Hart, 945 P.2d at 135. It was an error for the Trial Court not to
~

grant a new trial.

CONCLUSION
vJ

The Utah Baseball Academy is part of APL For 30 years it has trained baseball
players in Utah. Over 250,000 baseball players have participated in Academy programs.
More than 3,000 Academy players have received scholarships to play in college. Almost all

~

current professional players from Utah were developed in the Academy.

KeyBank's

mishandling of the API loan will kill the Academy if not held accountable. Do the right
thing. Save the Utah Baseball Academy. Reverse and remand this case for a jury trial.
DATED this

__jfb__ day of May, 2016.
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APl Construction Equity Account Statement
dated 5/31/05

KBl 1823 - KBJ 1826

34.

APl.Ex. 709.

APl Construction Equity Account Statement
dated 4/30/05

KBI 1827 - KBI 1831

35.

APJ.Ex. 710.

API Construction Equity Account Statement
dated 3/3 1/05

KBI 1832 - KBI 1833

36.

APJ.Ex. 711.

API Construction Equity Account Statement
dated 2/28/05

KBl 1834 - KBl 1835

37.

API.Ex. 712.

API Construction Equity Account Statement
dated 1/31/05

KBJ 1836 - KBJ 1838

38.

API.Ex. 713.

API Construction Equity Account Statement
dated 12/31 /04

KBl 1839 - KBl 1841

39.

API.Ex. 714.

API Construction Equity Account Statement
dated 1 1/30/04

KBI 1842 - KBI 1847

40.

API.Ex. 715.

API Construction Equity Account Statement
dated 10/31 /04

KBJ 1848 - KBJ 1849

41.

API.Ex. 716.

API Construction Equity Account Statement
dated 9/30/04

KBJ 1850 - KBl 1852

42.

API.Ex. 717.

APJ Construction Equity Account Statement
dated 8/3 J/04

KBl 1853 - KBI 1854

43.

APl.Ex. 718.

APl Construction Equity Account Statement
dated 7/3 I /04

KBJ 1855 - KBJ 1863

vi
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44.

APJ.Ex. 867.

Expert Report of Mark Hashimoto dated
3/7/08

45.

API.Ex. 868.

(Supplemental) Report of Mark Hashimoto
dated 3/29/ l 3

46.

API .Ex. 869.

Expert Report of J.F. "Chip" Morrow dated
3/7/08

47.

KB Ex. 33

Field Report 2/8/05 to Bob Keyes from
Cameo Construction

API03673-75

48.

KB Ex. 39

Letter to Bob Campbell from Russel L.
Naylor March l 4, 2005

KB03423-3428

49.

KB Ex. 56

Letter to Cameron Treat from Russell L.
Naylor August 25, 2005

KB07035

50.

KB Ex. 106

Summary of interest payments on API loans,
Exhibits 5 and 6 to Second Affidavit of
Sharron Troszak, April 30, 2008

51.

KB Ex. 127

Draw Request No. 7, dated March 4, 2005

API00826-827

52.

KB Ex. 225.

Camarella to Brady e-mail dated 3/1/05 re
interest payments past due

KB05908 - KB05909
KB05913,KB05976

53.

Rules and Regulations Applicable to Appeal

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
58
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

